ABSTRACT
Introduction
In this paper we use the exodus of the Vietnamese Boat People as a natural experiment to provide causal evidence of a long-run developmental impact of immigration, i.e. migrant networks promoting trade. Immigrants potentially foster international trade by reducing trade costs. Such frictions are quantitatively large, especially for poor countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) , and are so substantial that they have been advocated as a plausible explanation for the Six Major Puzzles in International Economics (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001) . Recent theoretical and empirical research has singled out information costs in particular as inhibiting trade flows (Chaney, 2014; Allen, 2014; Steinwender, 2013) . Immigrants may lower such frictions through their knowledge of their home country's language, regulations, market opportunities and informal institutions. So too are immigrants argued to decrease the costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts by drawing upon their trusted networks, thereby deterring opportunistic behavior in weak institutional environments (Greif, 1993; Gould, 1994; Rauch, 2001; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Dunlevy, 2006) . This is important, since weak institutions have been shown to significantly and adversely affect trade volumes (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Berkowitz et al., 2006) . Migrants are thus expected to facilitate bilateral trade mostly with developing countries, where firms typically need to navigate myriad bureaucratic and legal hurdles, Vietnam being a case in point.
While a large literature examines the pro-trade effect of migration, causality from migration to trade has yet to be conclusively established (Felbermayr et al., 2015) .
Studies almost ubiquitously uncover a positive correlation between migration and trade (Genc et al., 2012) , to the extent that these results are often interpreted as evidence of a positive diaspora externality. Doubts persist however as to whether trading partners' cultural affinity or else bilateral economic policies might be driving the observed positive correlations (Lucas, 2005; Hanson, 2010) . These doubts are valid since the estimated impacts of immigration on trade are quantitatively large and therefore represent an important channel through which migration might lead to gains from trade.
We use the exodus of the Vietnamese Boat People to the US as a natural experiment Our results show that US exports going to Vietnam over the period 1995-2010, i Our paper is the first to provide evidence from a natural experiment of the causal relationship between migrant networks and international trade, thereby addressing an issue that has lingered for over two decades of empirical research. Taking a broader perspective, our results provide evidence of the positive long-term economic benefits of immigration, namely export creation, thus emphasizing a strong channel through which migration may foster development. Building upon Gould's seminal insight (Gould, 1994) , our results lend further support to the idea that immigrants are fundamentally 4 differentiated from native populations in terms of their ties with their home nations. These ties, maintained by a common language and regular flows of information, 1 bring nations closer together and represent an important channel through which immigrants nurture long-run development.
Gould (1994) originally hypothesised two channels through which migrants may foster trade flows. He argued that immigrants may reduce the transaction costs of providing foreign market information, the so-called information channel and that immigrants' demand preferences, or nostalgia, may foster imports from their origin countries, what he termed the preference channel. By concentrating on the effect of (Vietnamese) immigration on (United States) exports, we isolate the information channel (see Felbermayr and Toubal (2012) ). Nonetheless the immigration shock might also have led to 'nostalgia' imports from Vietnam in addition to the opening of many restaurants and other businesses that rely on Vietnamese-specific skills and imports. These potentially translate into gains from variety for US consumers (Chen and Jacks, 2012) and export-led poverty reduction in Vietnam (McCaig, 2011) .
The following Section provides an account of the events that followed the Fall of Saigon and elucidates our natural experiment. Section 3 presents our data and empirical model. Our results are then presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
The Natural Experiment
In this section we describe the chronology of events surrounding the exodus of the Vietnamese Boat People from Vietnam to the US. The Fall of Saigon to the Communist 1 Despite the circumstances under which the first waves of Vietnamese left the country, Vietnamese refugees kept contact with families and friends in Vietnam. As Zhou (1997) writes, "Letters frequently moved between the receiving countries and Vietnam". Moreover the first companies that established long-distance telephone and flight services to Vietnam after 1994, drastically reducing information barriers between the two countries, were founded by Vietnamese migrants.
Vietnamese North in April 1975 proved the catalyst for the first wave of refugees from Vietnam, as the North pursued their wartime enemies, forcing over one million people into 're-education camps' and 'New Economic Zones' i.e. agricultural collectives. Following the first wave, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese fled overland and by sea relying on watercraft, often fishing boats, giving rise to their name 'The Boat People'. Those Vietnamese that were able to leave, fled overland to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand -or else headed for the open seas, to international waters and busy shipping lanes.
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The fortunate were rescued by ships' crews and taken to refugee camps in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, the so-called 'first asylum countries' where they typically faced squalid conditions.
In response to the unfolding crisis, the US President's Special Interagency Task The program of refugee resettlement began under emergency conditions and was carried out hurriedly. Due to its unprecedented scale and urgency, citizens, churches, and employers across the US were urged to sponsor refugees (Sonneborn and Johnston, 2007) . There are two main reasons why we argue this distribution is quasi-random. The first is that the refugees were dispersed throughout the US as policymakers, drawing on the lesson from the agglomeration of Cubans in Miami, were keen to avoid a similar Vietnamese refugee agglomeration.
4 Haines (1996) writes that "During House debate on the Indochina Migration and Refugee Act 1975 several speakers...referred repeatedly to the need to distribute refugees evenly about the country, to minimize impact upon specific labor markets and communities... This became the explicit policy of refugee resettlement for the Indochinese". In the words of Rumbaut (1995) , the "goal of resettlement through reception centers was to disperse refugees to 'avoid another Miami'...Consequently the initial resettlement efforts sought a wide geographic dispersal of Vietnamese families."
According to Zhou and Bankston (1998) Asia." It was no coincidence that the camp that received the greatest number of refugees was also located in a State that had historically been the least attractive to migrants, Arkansas (Robinson, 1998) . As shown in the top-left corner of Figure 4 , the dispersion policy led to a higher number of refugees in the most populous States (the number of refugees per State on 31 December 1975 is given in Table 1 ).
The second reason why the resettlement process was quasi-random is because the process of refugee allocation was anarchic and differences in agencies' pro-activeness resulted in a mal-distribution of caseloads. Refugees would need to register, some by choice and others by assignment, with a voluntary agency committed to finding them (and their families) a sponsor. 5 In theory, the matching process "consisted of reviewing the refugees' occupational background against a Department of Labor's listing of labor markets needing additional workers, comparing refugees' preferences for place of resettlement against the agency's opportunities, and assigning the refugees to a sponsor in the chosen locality" (Baker et al., 1984) . Thompson (2010) provides examples of some adverts for workers published in the camp newspaper from Indiantown Gap: "Workers for greenhouses in Maryland and North Carolina. Free housing, food, assistance, and wages."
or "Two fisherman needed for job in Florida. Position pays $2.10 per hour with sponsorship.
Housing to be provided in new house trailer plus farm animals and garden. Should be able to sex-sort and count fish." Despite this hypothesized process the reality on the ground was very different, such that nearly three-fourths of the sponsors chosen were either families or individuals as opposed to firms offering jobs (Marsh, 1980) . Thompson (2010) writes that Washington put tremendous pressure on the agencies, emphasizing the need for expeditious processing. He quotes the Department of Health, Education and Welfare Director, who noted that "Everyone worked 12-hour shifts, 7 days a week, and it was not uncommon to work 15 or 16 hours at a time." Never before had 5 In the first months of the program refugees could turn down offers of sponsorship. As noted by Thompson (2010) , of the 1,213 offers recorded at Indiantown Gap by the Sponsorship Coordination Center, 759 were eventually accepted. From October 1975 onwards, the US government made it almost impossible for a refugee to refuse an offer of sponsorship. the responsible agencies been required to resettle such unprecedented numbers in such a short space of time. The chaos that ensued in the camps led to confusion among the refugees with regards to which agency to sign-up with. The signing-up in large part was a function of how pro-active agency employees were. In Fort Chaffee for example, two agencies registered about 75% of the refugees and other agencies complained of a mal-distribution of caseloads (Thompson, 2010) . Robinson (1998) States -and to this day Minnesota is home to many Indochinese despite its bone-chilling winters". Moreover, "the religious VOLAGs...were less tied to specific job offers in settling refugees. A parish or church often sponsored their clients without a commitment on the part of the refugee to accept a particular job (Thompson, 2010) . This explains why only around 25% of the sponsors chosen were firms offering jobs (Marsh, 1980) . Due to the government dispersion policy as well as the differences in pro-activeness across relocation agencies, in most cases the refugees "were powerless to decide where and when they would be resettled the resettlement agencies almost entirely decided where the refugees would settle" (Zhou and Bankston, 1998) . This is further revealed by the large flows of secondary migration that took place in the following years, which occurred in the absence of government controls. In large part, this process was driven by the desire to reunite extended families separated during the resettlement process (Sonneborn and Johnston, 2007) , as well as a preference for warmer climates and more generous social welfare programs (Vo, 2006) . According to Baker et al. (1984) Importantly, the data show that economic and political variables played no role in the allocation process. As shown in Figure 4 , the number of refugees hosted across Last but not least, to demonstrate that the intensity of resettlement is not capturing differences in migrant characteristics, Figure Whereas the US Government facilitated movements of Vietnamese Boat People to 7 The US Government passed several important pieces of legislation to facilitate the arrival of the Vietnamese. The 1979 Orderly Departure Program allowed Vietnamese to legally emigrate on the basis of family reunion and on humanitarian grounds and estimates suggest that by the mid-1990s over two hundred thousand Vietnamese had entered the US under the Program. In 1980, the US Congress passed the Refugee Act -the most comprehensive piece of refugee legislation in US history -into law, which revised the provision of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act that previously admitted refugees into the US in limited proportions relative to the overall number of immigrants. The Amerasian Homecoming Act was passed in the US in 1988 to bring as many Amerasians to the US as possible. The final important piece of legislation passed by the US Congress to aid the Vietnamese was the 1989 Humanitarian Operation Program. In that year, the US and Vietnamese Governments agreed for former and current detainees in 're-education camps' to be allowed to depart for the US, the ultimate consequence of which was the arrival of a further 70,000 Vietnamese. 
Data and Empirical Strategy
As detailed in the previous section, the 1975 distribution of Vietnamese refugees was quasi-random and constitutes an ideal instrumental variable with which to establish a causal effect of Vietnamese migrant networks on US exports to Vietnam. The enduring trade embargo sharpens our natural experiment as the sequence of events, from the exogenous migrant shock to the opening-up of trade, closely mimics an experimental setting and removes concerns of reverse causality. Nevertheless, it is strictly the exogenous initial allocation of Vietnamese that matters for our identification.
Random allocations of refugees have been used for identification purposes in previous studies. For example: in Sweden by Edin et al. (2003) who estimate the causal effect of immigration on labor market outcomes, by Dahlberg et al. (2012) to estimate the effect of ethnic diversity on redistribution preferences and, in a slightly different approach, by Damm and Dustmann (2014) who investigate the effect of exposure to crime on criminal behavior across Danish neighborhoods. Our study is the first to use such an allocation to establish a trade-creation effect of migrants. Ongoing work by Cohen et al. (2012) uses the formation of World War II Japanese Internment Camps as an instrument to identify the impact of Japanese migrants on US exports to Japan. A particular advantage of the current study is the concurrent trade embargo.
10 Our analysis can only be conducted at the State level since more disaggregated data for our instrument are unavailable.
11 The Figure is constructed by applying the data for Vietnamese immigrants in 1995 from the US Census of 2000 available at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) to the corresponding map defined at the county level, such that all counties that constitute the same MSA will be defined as being host to the same number of immigrants.
correlation between the two data series is 0.98, such that our instrument is strong. (See our online appendix for first-stage results confirming the validity of our instrument (Table   3) ).
Our baseline cross-section regressions take the following form:
Here In light of the seminal paper by Silva and Tenreyro (2005) , we use an IV version of a Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator (PPML), as in Tenreyro (2007) . The use of this estimator ensures consistent estimates of elasticities in log linear models in cases where the log of the error term may not be independent of the regressors. Its use is now widespread in the estimation of gravity equations in international trade, as discussed in detail in Head and Mayer (2014) . An additional benefit of this estimator is that unlike log linear models it can be estimated even when the dependent variable is equal to zero. Table 1 for the concordance and classification into differentiated or homogenous goods). The main US exports to
Vietnam over the period (in absolute terms) were transportation equipment and food and kindred products, while leather and forest products are important in relative terms (see online-appendix Table 1 ). The data for our other control variables are taken from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Summary statistics are provided in online-appendix Table 2 .
Results
Our baseline second-stage results are shown in Table 2 . Both reduced-form and IV estimations confirm the causal effect of Vietnamese immigrants on US exports to Vietnam.
A 10% rise in Vietnamese immigration to a specific US state is estimated to causally increase that states' exports to Vietnam by between 4.5% and 13.8%. Our estimated βs of interest are therefore significantly higher than most comparable estimates in the existing literature, which reflects our context in which Vietnamese migrants could have had a larger effect on US state exports (since no trade previously existed between the two nations) because information constraints between the two countries will likely have been very high.
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13 Given that the literature has shown that migrant networks influence FDI as well as trade (Kugler and Rapoport, 2007; Aubry et al., 2014; Javorcik et al., 2011) , it is worth noting that one channel through which the Vietnamese might promote exports to Vietnam is via complementary FDI flows. In a broader context therefore, one concern is that point estimates resulting from studies that examine the impact of migration on trade represent an upper-bound in the absence of investment data. The use of our instrument should alleviate this concern in the current study. Moreover, a supplementary analysis demonstrates at least for US state level FDI data for the years for between 2003 and 2010, the only years for which, to the best of the author's knowledge such data are available, no correlations exist between those FDI data and either our dependent variable nor our instrument, thereby lending further credence To confirm the validity of our results we perform a number of robustness exercises, which are presented in Table 3 . Regression results in columns (1) and (2) adopt an alternative dependent variable, either exports as a share of total (state) exports or else exports as a share of state GDP, as an alternative way of capturing state size effects.
Columns (3) and (4) demonstrate that our results are robust to excluding potential outliers, either West Coast states or California specifically. The results in columns (5) and (6) rather replace our key independent variable, the stock of Vietnamese immigrants by US state with the stock of Chinese immigrants and the stock of all Asian immigrants respectively, so as to ensure that it is specifically Vietnamese migrants that are driving the observed relationship. In the case of Chinese migrants, our results indicate that greater numbers of Chinese are associated with lower US state exports to Vietnam, while our results for all Asian migrants are insignificant.
14 Finally, to check whether our results also provide evidence of the network/search view of trade (Rauch, 1996 (Rauch, , 2001 ), we follow Rauch and Trindade (2002) and run our baseline regression dividing exports into differentiated goods and homogenous goods, which we define as both reference-price goods and organized-market goods (see online-appendix Table 1 for the matching of NAICS code to Rauch categories). According to the network/search view, prices of differentiated goods fail to transmit full information in terms of their quality and characteristics to international buyers and sellers. Ethnic networks are therefore perfectly placed to be able to exploit international informational asymmetries and foster trade. In line with theory and the existing literature, we only find a robust pro-trade effect for differentiated products (columns (7) and (8)).
to our results. This analysis is not included in the paper for the sake of brevity but is available on request from the authors. 14 It might be the case that authorities allocated Vietnamese refugees to states with low Asian populations so as to avoid concentration. This would imply that information frictions with Asia were abnormally high in those states, which could lead to trade expanding disproportionately due to a mean reversion. In fact the initial allocation of Vietnamese migrants was positively correlated with existing Asian communities, although we find the overall number of Asians across states did not have any influence on US state exports.
As an additional robustness check, we also analyse the impact of Vietnamese migration on US state exports along a crude measure of the extensive margin, i.e. the number of industries (out of 28 (NAICS)) with positive exports to Vietnam. Our results ( Table   4 in the online appendix) indicate that doubling of Vietnamese migration increases the number of industries exported to Vietnam by around 18%, which is considerable when the breadth of our product categories is taken into account. Further robustness checks including alternate specifications and OLS estimates can be found in the working paper version of this article (Parsons and Vezina, 2014) .
To further corroborate our results, we run placebo regressions to ensure that our results capturing network effects are specific to Vietnamese exports. We re-estimate our baseline model substituting exports to Vietnam with exports to ten other countries in South-East and East Asia, in ten separate specifications. Our results in Table 4 , which show that Vietnamese migrants exert no effect on trade with any of the other ten countries, provide additional evidence of the causal link between Vietnamese immigration to US states and US state trade with Vietnam.
To further analyse the effect of the Vietnamese migrant network on exports in the 15 years following the lifting of the trade embargo, i.e. from 1995 to 2010, we estimate panel regressions of the following form:
Where V i remains the stock of Vietnamese migrants in 1995, X it are the exports of State i
to Vietnam in year t from 1995 to 2010, α t are year dummies and γ i state fixed effects. The inclusion of state fixed effects completely rules out the possibility that some unobserved state-level variable being correlated with our instrumental variable still exists. C it remains our set of control variables equivalent to those in equation 1. Results of our IV-PPML estimates are presented in the left panel of Figure 6 , which shows the heterogeneity of the impact of Vietnamese immigration on trade from 1995-2010 (see Table 5 
where α i are State fixed effects, P OLICY t is a dummy variable that switches from zero to one in years after 2001 or 2008. We instrument P OLICY t × V i with P OLICY t × 1975 refugees. Results from these panel regressions, which can be found in Table 6 in the online appendix, demonstrate that those states that hosted greater numbers of Figure 7 . Finally, the left panel of Figure 7 summarizes the results when we interact a time trend, rather than a policy dummy, with the Vietnamese network. The idea is to generalise the previous results and estimate how the Vietnamese migrants affected the average yearly growth over the whole period. We find that moving from the lowest to the highest number of Vietnamese increases export growth significantly, by around 8 percentage points, from 23% to 31%.
To further quantify the pro-trade effect of the Vietnamese migrants we simulate the counterfactual export paths of the top ten US States (in terms of Vietnamese migrants), should those States have hosted at least 50% fewer Vietnamese in 1995. We construct a synthetic version of each State's share of exports to Vietnam, which is a weighted average of the variable for other States that were home to at least 50% fewer Vietnamese (the synthetic controls end up having 95% fewer Vietnamese on average). The weights are generated so that the differences in export shares by industry and income per capita give the PPML, PPML-RF (reduced form) and IV-PPML estimates, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 provide the same estimates with extra controls. The figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors, and * stands for statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% percent level. 
